maryam barooti; Reza Akbarian; mohammad saidimehr
Abstract
Allameh Tabatabaie’s dominate view, at semantics of divine attributes including divine knowledge, is “basis of meaning” view. But this view, inattention to context of speech, causes appearance of difficulties at divine attributes; we are trying at this article to express defects of ...
Read More
Allameh Tabatabaie’s dominate view, at semantics of divine attributes including divine knowledge, is “basis of meaning” view. But this view, inattention to context of speech, causes appearance of difficulties at divine attributes; we are trying at this article to express defects of this view by explaining speech context and presenting it to “ basis of meaning” view and introduce the view that addresses itself to extension of this meaning in different contexts, attending to core of meaning (primitive meaning and ‘ verbal explanation’ meaning). This method is investigated in divine knowledge attribute to empty meaning of divine knowledge from simile.
jabar amini; mohammad saeedimehr
Volume 6, Issue 3 , October 2017, , Pages 1-18
Abstract
Abstract
Mulla Rajabali Tabrizi is one of the Iranian Muslim philosophers who lived in Safavid era and was a contemporary of Mulla Sadra. Tabrizi, however, rejected many principles of Sadra’s philosophy including the principle of the principality of existence. Tabrizi firmly defended the principality ...
Read More
Abstract
Mulla Rajabali Tabrizi is one of the Iranian Muslim philosophers who lived in Safavid era and was a contemporary of Mulla Sadra. Tabrizi, however, rejected many principles of Sadra’s philosophy including the principle of the principality of existence. Tabrizi firmly defended the principality of quiddity and at the same time endorsed a kind of objectivity of existence. In this paper, we first examine Tabrizi’s view through exploring his definitions for ‘quiddity’ and ‘existence’ and his picture of the relation between them. Then we raise some fundamental objections against his arguments for the principality of quiddity.
Mohammad Saeedi Mehr
Abstract
From the past, philosophers through philosophical approaches have tried to uncover the hidden aspects of the phenomenon that we call ‘pain’. One of the basic questions in this regard is the nature of pain to which Ibn Sina has addressed. Avicenna believes that the concept of pain is not self-evident, ...
Read More
From the past, philosophers through philosophical approaches have tried to uncover the hidden aspects of the phenomenon that we call ‘pain’. One of the basic questions in this regard is the nature of pain to which Ibn Sina has addressed. Avicenna believes that the concept of pain is not self-evident, sonot only onecan define it, but should do so. In his book Al-Isharatva Al-Tanbihāt, he has provided a precise definition of pain,according to whichpain is the perception of what is perceived as a pest and evil qua pest and evil. Nasir al-Din Tusi, in his commentary on the book, has given a detailed analysis of this definition. In spite of its precision, it seems that Ibn Sina's definition suffers from someambiguities, for exampleit is not clear whether the pain is merely a subjective matter or has objective features. Moreover, the lack of clarity in the distinction between acquirable (mediated) knowledge and direct (unmediated) knowledge in Sheikh’s philosophy, has made it difficult to express the being directness feature of pain as a kind of perception, in this definition.
Mohammad Saeedimehr; Saeed Moghaddas
Volume 3, Issue 2 , October 2013, , Pages 99-123
Abstract
There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism, which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom, and incompatibilism, which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii ...
Read More
There are two main philosophical theories concerning the explanation of the relation between the causal necessity and the human freedom: 1. Compatibilism, which believes that the causal necessity is compatible with the human freedom, and incompatibilism, which sees these two incompatible. Allamah Tabatabaii proposes a specific version of compatibilism based on the notion of “comparative contingency” (al-imkan al-bilqiyas). According to his theory, the principle of causal necessity does not require more than that the human free action possess comparative contingency in comparison with the human agent and comparative necessity in comparison with its complex perfect cause (al-illah al-tammah). Moreover, the very nature of the human freedom is nothing but the action’s being contingent in relation to his agent. Therefore, the causal comparative necessity of the action in relation to its complex perfect cause does not contradict its being free. This compatibilist view has been challenged by some contemporary philosophers. In this paper we first give a short explication of Tbatabaii’s theory and then examine the arguments of its critics.
